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WILLS AND TRUSTS
by
Charles 0. Galvin*

I. WILLS
Construction. Several cases before the Texas courts during the survey
period involved the nature of devised estates. In Fawcett v. IngrumI testatrix
Addiebel died testate in 1970 survived by her two sons, Allen and Robert, and
four grandchildren, each son having two children. The principal asset of her
estate was a ranch, which she devised to Allen as trustee with instructions to
hold the ranch intact for at least ten years. Thereafter he was given authority
to sell at his discretion and distribute the proceeds equally among the six
beneficiaries, two sons and four grandchildren. The will further provided that
should a beneficiary be deceased, then his share would pass to his heirs or in
accordance with his will. Within the ten-year period Allen as trustee souglt
and obtained a declaratory judgment authorizing the sale of the ranch. 2 While
this litigation was pending, testatrix's other son Robert died leaving his two
children surviving. Robert's will devised his interest in the ranch to his son
Robert, Jr. and the residue of his estate to his children Ann and Robert, Jr.
Ann contended that Addiebel's will created at most a power of appointment in
the ranch property, and she further maintained that there was an equitable
conversion of the ranch from an interest in realty to an interest in personalty.
Thus, it was her position that she shared the ranch interest with her brother
through the residuary clause in their father's will. The court rejected this
contention and construed Addiebel's will as leaving the elder Robert a present
vested equitable estate in realty. Therefore, when he died he specifically
devised such equitable estate to Robert, Jr., and Ann acquired no interest
therein.
In Tindol v. McCoy 3 John executed a will in 1914 and amended it by codicil
in 1917. He died in 1917. The will, among other things, left a life estate in
certain property to a grandson, then an estate for twenty years to the children
born to the body of such grandson with final vesting in such persons at the end
of the twenty-year term. An adopted daughter of the grandson contended that
under the Rule in Shelley's Case4 "children born to his body" were words of
limitation which vested a fee simple title in her father. She contended further
that as an adopted child she should be treated for all purposes as a natural
child. The court rejected both contentions, holding on the first issue that the
* B.S.C., Southern Methodist University; M.B.A., J.D., Northwestern University;

S.J.D., Harvard University. Dean and Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
1. 535 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
2. Ingrum v. Ingrum, 520 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
3. 535 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
4. The supreme court in Hancock v. Butler, 21 Tex. 804, 808 (1858), stated the Texas
definition of the rule as follows: "[W]hen a person takes an estate of freehold ...

and.

. .

there

is a limitation . . . to his heirs, or heirs of his body, as a class of persons, to take in succession,
from generation to generation, the limitation to the heirs entitles the ancestor to the whole estate
..
". The rule has been abrogated in Texas as to conveyances and wills taking effect after
Jan.l, 1964. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1291a (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
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words "children born to his body" were words of purchase and, therefore,
the grandson's estate was not a fee simple but a life estate. The court also held
that under the circumstances existing when the testator wrote his will, an
adopted child could not have been intended by him to be treated as a natural
child.
Hart v. Rogers5 involved a devise of all the testatrix's residuary estate to
her grandson Don in fee simple, provided that if Don "should precede me in
death, or if he should die without issue leaving no blood descendants," then
the residue of her estate was to vest in the children of her granddaughter
Helen. Don died without issue following the testatrix's death. The heirs of
Don contended that his death without issue had to occur before the testatrix's
death in order for the gift over to be effective. The court rejected this
contention, holding that Don's death at any time without issue caused the
property to pass under the proviso to Helen's children. On another issue the
court held that certain deeds executed before death, but which remained
undelivered and in the testatrix's control at death, were ineffective to pass
title to property.
Stover v. Seitz6 concerned a joint and mutual will which provided that all
property of the first spouse to die passed to the survivor in fee simple and
"that upon the death of such survivor any such estate then remaining" was to
be divided between a son and daughter. The husband died leaving his wife and
two children surviving. The son predeceased his mother, and the question at
issue was whether or not he had received any estate from his parents which
would then be subject to devise in his will. The court held that the son's
interest in his parents' estates was contingent on his being alive at his
mother's death; having predeceased her, he had no property interest to
devise.
In Eldridge v. MarshallNational Bank 7 a reference in a will to a "Scholarship Trust-That is being arranged" was held to manifest an intention to
create a present testamentary trust. The words "Scholarship Trust" stated a
sufficiently defined charitable purpose. Moreover, failure to designate a
trustee did not render the trust invalid because the court could appoint a
trustee to carry out the settlor's intent. 8
Finally, in Ruby v. Green9 there was a direction that if funds were
insufficient to satisfy special bequests, such bequests should be proportionately reduced. On the basis of a review of the entire will the court construed
the testatrix's intention to be that the term funds meant all properties, and not
just cash or cash assets.
These construction cases make abundantly clear the importance of the
draftsman's work. The description of interests in real and personal property,
directions to the executor, and other aspects of the will should be examined
carefully to be sure that the testator's intentions are clearly and sharply
articulated.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

527
527
527
See
535

S.W.2d 230 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
S.W.2d 829 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
S.W.2d 222 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 397 (1959).
S.W.2d 385 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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Proofof Will. Berry v. Griffin'0 reviews important legal rules with respect to
a lost will. If a validly executed will is last seen in the possession of the
decedent or in a place where the decedent had access to it and it cannot be
found after the decedent's death, the presumption is that the will was
destroyed with the intention of revoking it." In the instant case there was
testimony that an envelope was delivered to the testatrix and that she stated
that it was her will. There was contrary testimony to the effect that the will
was not in the testatrix's home. Other witnesses testified that she had not
discussed revoking her will, and that she was amicable toward the principal
beneficiary named in the will. The court held that the testimony that the will
was not in the testatrix's home could only establish that the witness had not
seen the will in the house, from which the first inference could be drawn that
the will was not in the house. From that inference, however, it could not be
further inferred that the testatrix did not have possession of the will nor ready
access to it.' 2 Thus, the presumption of revocation still stands absent clear
and convincing proof of nonrevocation. In another revocation case, Davis v.
Hoskins,13 the testimony was clear that the testatrix had destroyed her will,
the only conflicting testimony being as to the date on which it was destroyed.
Accordingly, a carbon copy of the destroyed will was denied probate.
Witnesses. Section 59 of the Texas Probate Code provides that the subscribing witnesses must sign in the presence of the testator. Should the
subscribing witnesses be unwilling or unable to testify, the court may hear
other evidence in order to assure that the proper solemnities were observed.14
In Jones v. Whiteley' 5 a deposition of an elderly subscribing witness stated
that he had not signed in the presence of the testatrix. Contrary testimony of
others was admissible to contradict that of the subscribing witness. Once the
solemnities were established as to a valid execution of a will, there was a
rebuttable presumption of nonrevocation and continuity.16 Accordingly, the
will was admitted to probate. McLeroy v. Douthit'7 involved another aspect
of the formalities of execution. The testator signed the will, and then he and
the two witnesses executed the self-proving affidavit. This execution was
held insufficient because the witnesses had not subscribed their names to the
will, but only to the separate self-proving affidavit. 8 The will was, therefore,
10. 531 S.W.2d 394 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
I1. See Mingo v. Mingo, 507 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
12. For a discussion of problems of inference on inference see I C. MCCORMICK & R. RAY,
TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE § 51 (2d ed. 1956).
13. 531 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, no writ).
14. Hopf v. State, 72 Tex. 281, 10 S.W. 589 (1888).
15. 533 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
16. McElroy v. Phink, 97 Tex. 147, 76 S.W. 753 (1903).
17. 535 S.W.2d 771 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth), writ ref'd, 539 S.W.2d 351 (Tex. 1976).
The contestants raised the issue of improper attestation for the first time on appeal. The Supreme
Court of Texas in refusing the application for writ of error stated that the contestants did not have
to plead improper attestation or file a motion for new trial. By their point of error the contestants
properly preserved the issue before the court of civil appeals to consider whether or not the trial
court had properly admitted the will to probate.
18. See 1955 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 55, at 88 (Vernon). In the instant case the self-proving
affidavit was dated Nov. 18, 1955, although such affidavit was not provided for in the statutes
until Jan. 1, 1956.

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 31

not properly admitted to probate. In another case, Perrittev. Birdwell, 19 two
documents, one dated in 1967 and the other in 1974, were offered for probate
as the last will of the deceased. With respect to the later will there was no
credible evidence that the subscribing witnesses signed in the presence of the
testator, and such will was, therefore, invalid.
Holographic Wills. Watkins v. Boykin2" concerned a document, partially
handwritten and partially typewritten, which was not clearly designated as a
will. Considering all the facts, the court found that the document as a whole
reflected a testamentary disposition, and that the portion which was wholly in
the testator's handwriting was sufficiently complete within itself to be
admitted for probate. In contrast, however, is In re Estate of Wilson 2' in
which the proponent of a will offered a letter from the deceased in which he
expressed an intent to leave his property to her. The decedent and the
proponent had been married and divorced, then remarried and the marriage
annulled. In the past the decedent had always given the name of the proponent
as the person to be notified in the event of his death or disability. The court
held that the letter was at most an expression of an intent to make a will and,
therefore, lacked the necessary requisites of present testamentary intent.
Effect of Divorce. In McFarlen v. McFarlen22 William and Velma were
married in 1932 and divorced in 1968. In June 1972 while William was single he
executed a will leaving his estate to Velma and nominating her as independent
executrix. A daughter was made beneficiary in the event Velma predeceased
William. In October 1972 Velma and William remarried but in 1974 that
marriage also ended in divorce. William later married Ruth and shortly
thereafter died. The court applied section 69 of the Texas Probate Code,
which provides that if a testator is divorced after making a will, all provisions
in favor of the divorced spouse are null and void. In the instant case the court
sustained the will as valid, but held that Velma could not take under the will
nor could she qualify as executrix. The daughter's interest in the estate was
also negated since she was only a contingent beneficiary. The result of the
holding was to permit the designated successor executor, a bank, to qualify
and administer the estate for William's heirs at law.
ConditionalWill or ConditionalBequest. Johnson v. Hewitt 23 dealt with the
effect of a clause in a 1966 will in which the testatrix left all her estate to her
friend, provided that she take care of the testatrix and not place her in an old
folks home. The probate court admitted the will to probate, but the district
court reversed, holding that the will was conditional, that the condition had
not been fulfilled, and that an earlier 1964 will should have been admitted to
probate. The court of civil appeals in reversing the district court held that the
1966 will was not conditional but only the devise to the friend was conditional.
Therefore, the later will should have been admitted to probate, and the
19. 539
20. 536
21. 539
22. 536
23. 539

S.W.2d
S.W.2d
S.W.2d
S.W.2d
S.W.2d

95 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, no writ).
400 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
99 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
590 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastand 1976, no writ).
239 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no writ).
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question of whether or not the devisee fulfilled the conditions to receive
under the will could be raised in a subsequent action in the probate court.
Testamentary Capacity. The rule of Carrv. Radkey 24 is that a witness may not
make conclusionary statements about the testator's mental capacity to make
a will, but may testify as to whether or not the testator had the capacity to
know the objects of his bounty, the nature of the transaction in which he was
engaged, the extent of his estate, and similar matters. Pearcev. Cross25 stated
that undue influence consists of the following two elements: (1) the external,
the words or acts that bring pressure to bear on the testator; and (2) the
internal, the collapse of the testator's own volition produced by such conduct.
Recent cases involving testamentary capacity should be viewed with these
two cases in mind.
In In re Estateof Woods 26 the Supreme Court of Texas held that there was
no evidence to support a jury finding of undue influence at the time the
testator executed his will and also no evidence of unsound mind when the
testator executed a codicil. In Stephen v. Coleman27 a testator suffering from
brain cancer was found to have testamentary capacity to execute a will on
December 27, 1974, although he died January 5, 1975. In Soto v. Ledezma28
the court determined that a testatrix dying of cancer did not have the capacity
to execute a will five months before her death. In Burk v. Mata 29 the court
affirmed the admission of a will to probate, even though the testimony as to
testamentary capacity was sharply conflicting, because there was sufficient
evidence on the basis of which the trier of facts could find that the testatrix
possessed the requisite capacity. But in Bradshaw v. Naumann30 a husband
and wife executed a deed which conveyed all their land to their son to the
exclusion of their daughter and reserved a life estate in themselves. A jury
found that the husband was acting under undue influence and that the wife did
not have the mental capacity to execute the deed. The court of civil appeals
reversed, holding that there was no evidence of probative force on the undue
influence issue and, although there was evidence of the peculiar conduct of
the wife, there was nothing that supported a finding of lack of mental
capacity.
Community or Separate. Pritchard v. Estateof Tuttle3 applied the familiar
rule that properties acquired during marriage are presumed community unless
they can be shown to be separate.3 2 In Estate of Tuttle the heirs of Tuttle
brought suit to recover their father's interest in the community estate existing
at his death. The only amount the surviving wife could trace was $30,000
24. 393 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. 1965). See also Lee v. Lee, 424 S.W. 2d 609 (Tex. 1968).
25. 414 S.W.2d 457 (Tex. 1966).
26. 542 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. 1976).
27. 533 S.W.2d 444 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
28. 529 S.W.2d 847 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, no writ).
29. 529 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
30. 528 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, no writ). But see Graham v. Darnell, 538
S.W.2d 690 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, no writ), in which it was found that the requisite
testamentary capacity was lacking because of insane delusions.
31. 534 S.W.2d 946 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, no writ).
32. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.02 (Vernon 1975).

20
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which she brought into the marriage in 1956, and with respect to this amount
the court refused to make any adjustment to bring the value of such 1956
dollars to a present value level. The court also refused to consider a divorce
proceeding pending at the decedent's death in which the wife could have
sought an unequal partition of the community favoring her. Pritchard v.
Snow3 3 was a simultaneous death case which held that the husband's estate
was entitled to the entire proceeds of life insurance because the policies had
their inception before marriage. The community's right to reimbursement for
premiums paid with community funds was fully discharged by deducting from
the proceeds of the policy a debt representing funds that had gone into the

community. Anderson v. Anderson34 held that the community property of
husband and wife placed in a son's name continued to be community
property. Subsequent to her husband's death the wife had invested the funds
with the son in a bank account under a survivorship agreement. Since the
funds remained community property, her investment could only affect her
interest and, therefore, the husband's interest was held to belong to his heirs.
Foreign Wills and Administration. In Eikel v. Burton3 5 the court relied on the

established rule that a foreign administrator under appointment in another
state cannot bring suit in Texas without a Texas appointment. This rule was
applied despite an attempted waiver by the parties as to the administrator's

lack of capacity to bring suit. The court reasoned that the parties could not
confer jurisdiction over the estate by agreement when no person was authorized to represent the estate in such agreement.36
Will Contest-Attorneys' Fees. In Muse, Currie & Kohen v. Drake37 the

supreme court held that an administratrix of an estate had no right to appeal a
will contest because in her representative capacity she was not an interested
party as required by Texas Probate Code sections 93 and 100.38 Therefore,
fees and expenses of the law firm could not be allowed against the estate. In El
Paso National Bank v. Leeper,39 however, a fee was allowed to an attorney

for services rendered for a temporary administrator in a case in which the
temporary administrator had not rendered its final account and had not been
discharged in transferring the estate to an independent executor.
33. 530 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
34. 535 S.W.2d 943 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, no writ). See also Carnes v. Meador, 533
S.W.2d 365 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (case remanded to determine if
deceased husband's transfer of community property was in fraud of the wife and whether a
daughter's interest in certain funds was by right of survivorship or as a third party beneficiary).
35. 530 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See also
Eikel v. Bristow Corp., 529 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1975, no writ).
36. 530 S.W.2d at 909.
37. 532 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975), writ ref'd, 535 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. 1976).
But see Blackmon v. Nelson, 535 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ), in
which the court remanded for trial the issue of whether or not the executrix under an annulled will
had acted in good faith in defending its probate for which she would be entitled to reimbursement
for expenses and attorneys' fees. See also Estate of Tartt v. Harpold, 531 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (allowing the fees of an attorney who
represented unknown heirs to be paid out of estate); Humane Soc'y v. Austin Nat'l Bank, 531
S.W.2d 574 (Tex. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 2177, 48 L. Ed. 2d 800 (1976) (attorneys' fees
allowed for will construction suit).
38. "Interested persons" is defined in TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 3(r) (Vernon 1956).
39. 538 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, no writ).
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Determination of Heirship. In Wickware v. Session 40 the court applied full
faith and credit to a California proceeding which determined that the illegitimate children of an intestate father were entitled under California law to
inherit his property. The effect of the California decision was to legitimate the
children for purposes of inheritance in Texas. In Reilly v. Jacobs 41the court
of civil appeals approved the trial court's finding that a common law marriage
existed where the parties lived together as husband and wife and held each
other out to the public as such. Thus, the surviving wife of such common law
marriage was a proper heir of her deceased husband.
Removal of Administratrix. In Pipes v. Christenson 42 an administratrix failed
to file a proper inventory and to give a new bond and in addition paid out large
sums of money discharging alleged debts. The county court refused to
remove her as administratrix. The court of civil appeals reversed the lower
court, pointing out that such gross deficiencies in the performance of her
duties in a representative capacity required her removal.
Procedure. Eisenhauer v. Williams 43 held that a plea in abatement was
properly sustained against an executor who filed suit for construction of a will
44
while the estate was pending in the county court. In re Estate of Bateman
held that the county court was without jurisdiction to require an amended
inventory from an independent executor upon complaint of a remainderman
under the will as to alleged omissions from the original inventory.
In Stutts v. Stovall 4 the San Antonio court of civil appeals considered the
recently amended section 5(e) of the Probate Code which provides that final
orders of any court exercising original probate jurisdiction shall be appealable
to the courts of civil appeals. In Stutts a dispute arose as to whether the
widow of the deceased had been put to an election to take under her husband's
will, and if so, whether she had made an election. On motion for summary
judgment the probate court held that the widow was put to an election but that
there was a fact issue as to whether she had exercised such election. The
widow appealed and the court of civil appeals dismissed, holding that the
order was not a final order from which an appeal could be taken since a fact
issue remained as to one of the issues considered at the summary judgment
hearing.
Antenuptial Agreement. In Frey v. Estate of Sargent' George Sargent, an
eighty-year-old single man, and Ruby Frey entered into an antenuptial
40. 538 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
41. 536 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.). A review of common
law marriage appears in Grigsby v. Reib, 105 Tex. 597, 153 S.W. 1124 (1913).
42. 530 S.W.2d 860 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, no writ).
43. 537 S.W.2d 336 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, no writ); see Thomas v. Price, 534
S.W.2d 730 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, no writ) (domicile of the decedent, for the purpose of
establishing venue to probate his will, was county in which he was adjudged insane, and county
court could take judicial notice of insanity proceedings).
44. 528 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
45. 531 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, no writ).
46. 533 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The agreement was
made in Oklahoma to be performed in Texas; therefore, Texas law governed.
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agreement pursuant to which George would bequeath $30,000 cash to Ruby if
she would take care of him. Two-and-a-half years later, after Ruby's death,
George changed his will omitting the bequest. Thereafter, George died and
Ruby's lineal descendants sought to enforce the bequest. The court held that
the bequest required Ruby's personal performance. Accordingly, after her
death there was nothing to which her estate was entitled that could descend to
her heirs.
Joint and Mutual Wills. A joint and mutual will may be executed by two or
more parties and becomes the will of each on their respective deaths. The will
as to each may be revoked like any other will unless the will is contractual.
That is, if the parties have each executed the document in consideration of the
other's execution, then upon the death of the first, the other is bound by his
contract to permit the devolution of property to occur as agreed. Should the
survivor disregard the obligation and revoke the will, those who would have
taken under the joint will may impress a trust for their benefit.
Absent a clear intention to the contrary, the properties subject to the joint
will are usually those properties which the parties owned at the death of the
first. Properties later acquired by the survivor are covered only if there is a
clear expression to this effect.4 7 This problem was recently considered in
Wallace v. Turriff.48 In Wallace a husband and wife executed a joint will
reciting "that the survivor of us . . . shall have all of the estate of every
character. . . which either or both may own. . . at the time of the death of
the one of us dying first . . . ." The will further provided that "for the
consideration and benefits herein derived by the survivor, we. . . agree that
at the death of the survivor. . . all the property. . . that the survivor may die
seized and possessed of, will go to" the heirs of the husband. After the
husband's death the wife executed a holographic will limiting the bequest of
the husband's heirs to the value of the estate at the death of the husband. The
husband's heirs brought suit contending that the terms of the joint will entitled
them to the entire estate of the wife measured at the time of her death. The
court of civil appeals accepted this contention and held that a trust was
imposed on "all" assets of the estate in favor of the beneficiaries under the
joint will. The dissent rejected the contention of the husband's heirs pointing
out that the joint will controlled only as to "the property" and that the
reference to "the property" was limited to property as it existed at the time of
the husband's death.
Although an attempt to change the devolution of property under a joint will
was held ineffective in Wallace, the changes may become effective if the
applicable statute of limitations has run. On motion for rehearing in Morris v.
Texas Elks Crippled Children's Hospital, Inc.49 the El Paso court of civil
47. Murphy v. Slaton, 154 Tex. 35, 273 S.W.2d 588 (1954). See also Tips v. Yancey, 431
S.W.2d 763 (Tex. 1968); Nye v. Bradford, 144 Tex. 618, 193 S.W.2d 165 (1946).
48. 531 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see Glover v. Landes,
530 S.W.2d 910 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (joint will left
husband's estate to wife; while husband's will was pending, wife died leaving another will; held:
beneficiaries under wife's will were not indispensable parties in contest of husband's will).
49. 525 S.W.2d 874, 884 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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appeals withdrew its earlier opinion 5° and held that property which devolved
under an ineffective modified joint will, as in Wallace, would become
effective after passage of the applicable statute of limitations. In Morris Mr.
and Mrs. Denny executed a joint will in 1941 leaving all their properties to
each other with remainders to relatives. Mrs. Denny died in 1950 and the joint
will was filed for probate. In 1961 Mr. Denny executed a new will leaving his
ranch in Terrell County to the hospital. After his death the executor of his
estate conveyed the ranch to the hospital in 1962 and 1963. The relatives
named in the 1941 joint will learned of the 1961 will of Mr. Denny in 1972 and
claimed that the hospital held the ranch in trust for their benefit. The hospital
brought an action in trespass to try title and the trial court found for the
hospital.
The court of civil appeals initially reversed the trial court, holding that the
joint will was contractual and that Mr. Denny's attempt to change the order of
devolution 6f property resulted in a trust for the benefit of the relatives under
the 1941 will. On rehearing the court emphasized that the hospital accepted
the deeds to the land in 1962 and 1963, entered into possession, paid taxes, and
asserted its ownership for a period of ten years prior to suit. The court further
pointed out that the hospital was not put on notice as to the relatives' claims
because the 1941 will was never made of record in Terrell County. Accordingly, the court reversed its initial decision, and held that the hospital's title was
perfected by adverse possession under the five and ten-year statutes of
limitations.
II.

TRUSTS

Bank as Trustee. In Burnett v. First National Bank51 an adult beneficiary
assented to and ratified loans by the trustee bank to entities in which the
beneficiary had an interest. Accordingly, the court held that the beneficiary
could not allege that the bank by making the loans had failed to discharge its
duties as trustee.
Shannon v. Frost National Bank52 involved a situation where the trusteebank invested the funds of the trustor-beneficiary in a common trust fund.
According to the applicable regulations governing funds in a common trust, a
request for withdrawal of funds must be submitted prior to the quarterly
valuation date of the common trust in order to withdraw funds from that trust
during the quarter. The trustee-bank invested the funds in such a trust despite
knowledge that it was the trustor-beneficiary's intention to withdraw funds to
meet emergencies. When the trustor-beneficiary made demand for distributions to meet emergency situations the bank advised her that it would be more
economical to borrow money from the bank at a lower interest rate than to
draw money out of the trust which was earning at a higher interest rate. Two
years after the money was placed in the trust the trustor-beneficiary sought
50. 525 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.), discussed in Galvin,
Wills and Trusts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 13, 17 (1976).
51. 536 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
52. 533 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Compare the
self-dealing aspects of Shannon with Harvey v. Casebeer, 531 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. Civ. App.Tyler 1975, no writ).
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immediate withdrawal of all funds in the trust. The bank denied immediate
withdrawal because of the regulation requiring prior notice. Trustorbeneficiary brought suit against the bank alleging self-dealing regarding the
loan transactions and breach of the bank's fiduciary duty. The trial court
granted an instructed verdict in favor of the bank.
On appeal the court of civil appeals first pointed out that review of an
instructed verdict requires the appellate court to view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff. The court went on to reject plaintiff's
contention that the bank automatically breached its fiduciary duty by investing the funds in a common trust where the trust between bank and trustorbeneficiary was revocable at will. The plaintiff had argued that she had the
right to withdraw funds at any time in a revocable trust, and, therefore, by
placing the funds in a common trust, the bank incapacitated itself from
complying with the terms of a revocable trust. The court of civil appeals,
however, reversed the trial court and remanded to determine if the trusteebank had disclosed sufficient information to put the trustor-beneficiary on
notice that the funds had been invested in a common trust with the resultant
limitations. The court felt that failure adequately to disclose would be a
breach of the bank's fiduciary duty. This decision could have a significant
effect on what would generally be the accepted practice of corporate
fiduciaries.
In Linder v. Citizens State Bank 53 the question of a fiduciary relationship
arose between a home builder and the bank which was financing the home. In
Linder an owner of land arranged interim financing with the bank to build a
house. The project fell into difficulty and the owner sued the bank contending
that it failed to supervise advances of money. A judgment was rendered in the
trial court for the bank notwithstanding a jury verdict for the owner. Taking
the evidence most favorable to the owner the court could not find that the
bank had failed to keep its commitment: to advance the funds up to the point
when the work was terminated. The court of civil appeals in affirming the trial
court judgment pointed out that a fiduciary relationship between the bank and
plaintiff could not arise in this context unless the parties had previously dealt
with each other. Because the parties had had no previous dealings, the court
ruled that there was no fiduciary relationship and accordingly rejected the
plaintiff's contention that a constructive trust arose with respect to funds
advanced by the bank.
Cogdell v. Fort Worth National Bank 54 determined that a bank had the
authority to continue beyond the termination date of the trust to do whatever
was necessary, including proceeding with litigation, to effect an orderly
winding up of the trust. Venue for the suit was the principal place of business
of the bank trustee.
53. 528 S.W.2d 90 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
54. 537 S.W.2d 304 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, writ dism'd). See also Cogdell v.
Cogdell, 537 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (suit dismissed as
involving same parties in previous litigation).

19771

WILLS AND TRUSTS

Spendthrift Trust. In FirstBank & Trust v. Goss55 a judgment creditor sought
to garnish the accumulated income of a spendthrift trust created by the
beneficiary's grandmother. The court of civil appeals denied the judgment
creditor's action, reasoning that the spendthrift trust protected the principal
as well as the accumulated income. The court recognized that protection
would not be available where the settlor creates the trust and makes himself
the beneficiary, but refused to accept that a beneficiary became a settlor for
purposes of that exception by merely failing to draw on the accumulated
income.
Profit-Sharing Retirement Trust. Fox v. Smith 56 held that an employees'
profit-sharing retirement trust is owned by the former spouses as tenants in
common after divorce. A share left by the husband to his sister was,
therefore, owned half by the sister and half by the former wife; each
beneficiary's share was subject to an equal charge for the expenses and
trustees' attorneys' fees.
Oral Trust. In Armstrong v. Armstrong57 the husband made his wife
beneficiary of insurance policies after she agreed to pay the proceeds in
accordance with his desires. According to the agreement the proceeds were to
be paid to his sons, the estate of Avis Armstrong, and his wife. The sons
brought suit against the surviving widow on the theory of an oral trust. The
court of civil appeals reversed and remanded for failure to join the estate of
Avis Armstrong as a party. The court neld that all beneficiaries having a joint
interest would be indispensable parties.
III.

TAXATION

Federal Taxes-Gift Tax. Section 2503(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of
195458 provides that gifts to minors will qualify for the annual $3,000 exclusion
if the property and income may be expended for the benefit of the minor and,
to the extent not so expended, will pass to the donee at age twenty-one, or if
he dies before attaining twenty-one then such property and income must be
payable to the donee's estate or to those whom he may appoint under a
general power of appointment.
In Gall v. United States59 the settlors created trusts for two children with
provisions that the trust property would be distributed to whomever the
beneficiary appointed by will. If the beneficiary failed to make such appointment, then the property would be distributed to the surviving issue of the
settlors, or in the absence of such issue, to the beneficiary's estate. The
beneficiary could not exercise the power of appointment until he or she
attained nineteen years of age. The court held that the restrictions in the trust
instrument disqualified the trust under section 2503(c) because it was possible
that the property would not pass to the beneficiary's estate if he died before
55. 533 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no writ).
56. 531 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ).
57. 532 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1976, no writ).
58. I.R.C. § 2503(c).
59. 521 F.2d 878 (5th Cir. 1975).

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

attaining age twenty-one. The annual
disallowed.

[Vol. 31

exclusions were accordingly

Federal Taxes-Income Tax. In Lamkin v. United States6° a will provided
that certain income producing real property would become part of a testamentary trust. Before the trust was established the executor distributed income to
the beneficiaries of the prospective trust. Under section 167(h) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 195461 it was held proper to allocate depreciation to the
beneficiaries on the basis of the income received by each.
Federal Taxes-Estate Tax Lien. Kleine v. United States62 held that the
federal estate tax lien follows the property in an independent administration
of a will as provided in the Texas Probate Code 63 unless the lien is divested
pursuant to section 6324(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 195464 which
requires that the proceeds of a sale be used to pay charges against the estate
and expenses of its administration as may be "allowed by any court having
jurisdiction thereof." The issue raised was whether this statute impinged
upon and interfered with the Texas practice of independent administration.
The court held that court approval under the circumstances did not intrude
into the Texas probate system.
It should be noted that section 6325(c) 65 authorizes the Internal Revenue
Service to issue administrative releases. This practice, which is often used in
Texas, permits the independent executor to sell property and escrow the
proceeds or apply the proceeds to tax liability, debts, claims, and expenses so
that the property passes free of federal tax liens. When utilizing this process
no intervention of the court is necessary.

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

533 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1976).
I.R.C. § 167(h).
539 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1976).
TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 145-146 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
I.R.C. § 6324(a)(1).
Id. § 6325(c).

